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BIPA: WHAT DOES IT STAND FOR? 
PAIGE SMITH
INTRODUCTION
The year is 2018. Social media is abuzz with screenshots from a 
trendy new app by Google, called Google Arts & Culture. The app experi-
enced rapid popularity when it introduced a new feature, which allowed its 
users to submit a photo of themselves in order to discover what piece of art 
from the collection of museums on Google Arts & Culture most resembles 
the user.1 Amidst the worldwide internet excitement the app created, Illi-
nois users had a different experience. When an Illinois user would down-
load the app, the user would not be offered the option to utilize this 
feature.2
The reason behind the absence of this app’s presence in Illinois stems 
from an abundance of caution by Google, which resulted from what has 
been deemed “one of the strictest laws of its kind in the nation.”3 Though it 
is unsettled whether Google’s app would violate Illinois’s strict data priva-
cy laws, Google opted to avoid the Illinois market completely.4
In the early 2000’s, a company called Pay By Touch promised to revo-
lutionize the way the world pays by using a biometric authentication sys-
tem.5 This system linked users’ fingerprints to credit cards, checking 
accounts, loyalty programs, and other accounts, allowing users to pay with 
the touch of their finger rather than the swipe of their credit card.6 Pay By 
Touch had amassed thousands of users as the largest fingerprint scan sys-
 1.  Michelle Luo, Exploring Art (through selfies) with Google Arts & Culture, THE KEYWORD
(Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.blog.google/outreach-initiatives/arts-culture/exploring-art-through-selfies-
google-arts-culture/ [https://perma.cc/ANN4-4CKN]. 
 2.  Ally Marotti, Google’s Art Selfies Aren’t Available in Illinois. Here’s Why., CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 
17, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-google-art-selfies-20180116-story.html? 
[https://perma.cc/S55U-6HF6]. 
 3.  Ally Marotti, Proposed Changes to Illinois’ Biometric Law Concern Privacy Advocates, CHI.
TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-illinois-biometrics-bills-
20180409-story.html# [https://perma.cc/G5YX-NCUZ].
 4.  Marotti, supra note 2. 
 5.  Erica Gunderson, Are We Safer in Illinois, Or Just Having Less Fun?, WTTW (Jan. 22, 
2018), https://news.wttw.com/2018/01/22/biometric-data-are-we-safer-illinois-or-just-having-less-fun 
[https://perma.cc/QS4H-D4FY]. 
 6.  Id.  
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tem in Illinois, with their program used in grocery stores, gas stations, and 
cafeterias.7 In 2007, Pay By Touch began bankruptcy proceedings.8 The 
Illinois legislature reacted to the bankruptcy proceedings by enacting the 
Biometric Information Privacy Act in 2008, in an effort to prevent Pay By 
Touch from selling the fingerprints of its users as an asset in its bankruptcy 
proceedings.9
In considering whether Google’s app would have violated Illinois’s 
strict privacy laws, one must examine Google’s main cause for concern, the 
Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”). BIPA contains protections to 
prevent misuse of biometric data through regulation of the “collection, use, 
safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric 
identifiers and information.”10 BIPA defines “biometric identifier” as “a 
retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geome-
try.”11 The statute defines “biometric information” as “any information, 
regardless of how it is captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on an 
individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual.”12
Google, in a message to users on the app, said that the app works by 
allowing the user to take a photo of his or her face, which is then sent to 
Google and stored for the amount of time it takes to analyze and find an 
artwork that matches the user.13 Once the user submits the photo, Google 
uses facial recognition software to detect the face within the image and 
subsequently create a faceprint of unique characteristics to compare against 
information in its database.14 As Google is using the image of the user to 
create a scan of face geometry and subsequently storing the information for 
any period of time, Google’s actions would likely fall under the purview of 
BIPA. As such, were Google to implement this feature in Illinois, BIPA 
 7.  Charles N. Insler, Understanding the Biometric Information Privacy Act Litigation Explosion,
106 ILL. B.J. 34, 35  
(2018). 
 8.  Jon Van & Becky Yerak, Payment By Fingerprint Disappears, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 21, 2008), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2008-03-21-0803200909-story.html. 
 9.  Id.
 10.  Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2008) 
 11.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Aaron Young, How Google’s Art App Matches Your Face With a Famous Painting (and Why 
Everyone’s Obsessed With It), DES MOINES REGISTER (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/tech/2018/01/16/google-arts-culture-app-selfie-famous-
painting-iphone-android/1035861001/ [https://perma.cc/V7KT-ZCJX]. 
 14.  Eileen Guo, How Google Arts and Culture’s Face Match A.I. Actually Works, INVERSE (Jan. 
14, 2018), https://www.inverse.com/article/40177-google-arts-and-culture-technology 
[https://perma.cc/D95Y-5TS4]. 
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would require that Google take certain steps to protect Illinois users’ data 
privacy. 
First, BIPA prohibits companies from “collect[ing], captur[ing], pur-
chas[ing], receiv[ing] through trade, or otherwise obtain[ing]” a person’s 
biometric data without first informing the subject of both: (1) the collection 
or storage itself, as well as the specific purpose and length of term of the 
collection or storage and (2) obtaining written consent for the collection or 
storage.15 In addition, BIPA mandates that a company in possession of 
biometric identifiers or information develop and disseminate a written poli-
cy that details both a retention schedule and guidelines for permanent de-
struction of the data.16 A company must destroy data “when the initial 
purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been 
satisfied or within [three] years of the individual’s last interaction with the 
private entity, whichever occurs first.”17 As such, in order to comply with 
BIPA, Google would be required to provide Illinois users with a notifica-
tion containing the above information regarding collection, storage, reten-
tion, and destruction of their biometric data, as well as obtain their written 
permission for such storage. 
Next, in order to safeguard biometric information, BIPA prohibits 
companies from selling, leasing, trading, or otherwise profiting from col-
lected biometric data or disseminating this data without the express consent 
of the user.18 Thus, Google would be prohibited under BIPA from dissemi-
nating Illinois user data to any third party without prior written consent. 
BIPA requires that private entities use a “reasonable standard of care” 
to protect biometric data in a manner that is the same or more protective 
than the manner in which they store other confidential and sensitive infor-
mation.19 Should a company breach the statute, BIPA provides a right of 
action to “any person aggrieved by a violation of this act,” from which the 
aggrieved party may recover statutory liquidated damages in the amount of 
$1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater, for each violation of the 
statute.20 Therefore, were Google to implement this feature in Illinois, it 
could potentially open itself up to private actions brought under BIPA 
should it violate any of the above requirements, which could cost the com-
pany significant legal fees. 
 15.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b). 
 16.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(a). 
 17.  Id.
 18.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(c)–(d). 
 19.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT.14/15(e).  
 20.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20.  
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However, current caselaw leaves questions remaining as to what types 
of violations of BIPA may lead to a judgment against the company. Class 
action litigation brought under BIPA has exploded in recent years, center-
ing initially around the hotly contested definition of “person aggrieved.”21
The arguments in favor of dismissal suggest that a violation of BIPA with-
out any further measurable “harm” to the plaintiff is insufficient to confer 
standing, constitutional or statutory, and therefore, the actions must be 
dismissed. 
Section I of this note will discuss the issues raised by current caselaw 
interpreting BIPA litigation, specifically addressing both procedural stand-
ing and how courts have interpreted the language “person aggrieved” in the 
context of statutory standing. Section I will also review the current disputes 
facing BIPA litigation today. Finally, Section II will consider the future of 
judicial interpretation of BIPA, arguing that BIPA’s stated intent to protect 
data misuse should lead to broad judicial interpretations of the statute such 
that it avoids interpretations inconsistent with the purpose of the legislation. 
I. BIPA LITIGATION AT THE MOTION TO DISMISS STAGE
From its inception in 2008, BIPA existed without litigation until 2015, 
when Judge Norgle, in Norberg v. Shutterfly, stated that, to that date, he 
was “unaware of any judicial interpretation of the statute.”22 Following 
Shutterfly, a flurry of class action complaints was filed, which have raised a 
multitude of issues in the judicial statutory interpretation of BIPA. Many 
defendants’ motions to dismiss challenged standing as a threshold issue, 
under both procedural and statutory standing theories. 
Both federal23 and state24 courts have heard BIPA claims, with most 
claims being litigated in federal courts largely the result of removal by 
defendants.25 While federal courts are able to interpret Illinois law, deci-
 21.  IL Supreme Court decides to take up Six Flags fingerprint privacy case; spurs fresh rise in 
BIPA lawsuits, COOK COUNTY REC. (Jun. 29, 2018), https://cookcountyrecord.com/stories/511470207-
il-supreme-court-decides-to-take-up-six-flags-fingerprint-privacy-case-spurs-fresh-rise-in-bipa-lawsuits 
[https://perma.cc/SN62-YV3F]. 
 22.  152 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 2015); see King v. Order of United Commercial Trav-
elers of America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948). 
 23.  See McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc. No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 
2016); Dixon v. Washington & Jane Smith Cmty.—Beverly, No. 17 C 8033, 2018 WL 2445292 (N.D. 
Ill. May 31, 2018). 
 24.  See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197 (Ill. 2019);; Sekura v. Krishna 
Schaumburg Tan Inc., 115 N.E.3d 1080 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). 
 25.  Goings v. UGN, Inc., No. 17-cv-9340, 2018 WL 2966970, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2018); 
Howe v. Speedway LLC, No. 17-cv-07303, 2018 WL 2445541, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018); Peatry 
v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 766, 767 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2019). 
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sions made in federal courts are not binding on state courts, and decisions 
made by state courts are not binding upon federal courts.26 Decisions made 
by either respective court may be used as persuasive authority, but federal 
and state courts are not bound to follow the other’s decisions, especially 
where the decisions are made at the trial court level.27 However, since the 
majority of the BIPA cases currently in federal court are the result of re-
moval, the Erie doctrine commands federal courts use Illinois law to ana-
lyze substantive legal claims, but it allows them to use federal law to 
analyze procedural issues, including standing.28 Thus, when analyzing the 
procedural issue of standing, a federal court will apply federal law. 
A. BIPA Plaintiffs Satisfy Federal Procedural Standing 
Procedural standing in federal court will necessarily breed caselaw 
distinctive from state court, as standing, a threshold requirement for federal 
litigation, is governed by Article III of the United States Constitution.29
Article III standing requires “[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an inju-
ry-in-fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the de-
fendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 
decision.”30 Federal caselaw development of BIPA’s federal standing juris-
prudence begins with Spokeo v. Robins.31 In Spokeo, the plaintiff, Robins, 
alleged a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) against the 
defendant, Spokeo, a company that operates a “people search engine.”32 In 
order to perform a search with Spokeo, an individual inputs a person’s 
name, phone number, or email address, and Spokeo searches multiple data-
bases to provide information on the subject of the search.33 Robins was the 
subject of such a search.34 Spokeo’s search of Robins returned incorrect 
information about Robins, which was later disseminated.35 Robins filed a 
complaint on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated 
individuals alleging that Spokeo failed to comply with the statutory provi-
sions of the FCRA.36
 26.  See King, 333 U.S. at 153; People v. Williams, 641 N.E.2d 296 (Ill. 1994). 
 27.  See King, 333 U.S. at 153.  
 28.  Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 29.  Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016). 
 30.  Id. at 1547. 
 31.  Id. at 1545. 
 32.  Id. at 1547. 
 33.  Id. at 1544. 
 34.  Id.
 35.  Id.
 36.  Id. at 1544-46. 
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The district court granted Spokeo’s motion to dismiss on the grounds 
that Robins’s complaint had not properly pled an injury-in-fact, as required 
by Article III standing.37 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district court’s decision, finding that “the violation of a statutory 
right is usually a sufficient injury-in-fact to confer standing.”38 The Ninth 
Circuit held that the key issue to enable recovery under the act was that 
Spokeo violated Robins’s personal statutory rights, not just the statutory 
rights of others.39
The Supreme Court reversed the finding of the Ninth Circuit.40 The 
Court, in examining Article III standing, looked particularly at the “injury-
in-fact” requirement.41 In order to establish injury-in-fact, the Court re-
quires a plaintiff to show that he or she “suffered ‘an invasion of a legally 
protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or immi-
nent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”42 Particularization must affect the 
plaintiff in an individual or personal way and is necessary, but not suffi-
cient, to establish standing.43 The injury must also be “concrete.”44 The 
Court held that, though the injury may be an intangible harm created by the 
legislature, congressional grant of a statutory right and private right of ac-
tion does not automatically satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.45 The 
Court also stated that risk of real harm could satisfy concreteness.46 How-
ever, the situation in the present case may not have presented the risk for 
real harm, as the Court had trouble imagining that dissemination of incor-
rect information, such as a zip code, introduces the risk of concrete harm.47
Regardless, the Court ultimately did not make a finding as to whether Rob-
ins satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement, finding instead that the Ninth 
Circuit had not appropriately analyzed injury-in-fact by failing to distin-
guish concreteness from particularization.48 As such, the Court remanded 
the case for proceedings consistent with their opinion.49
 37.  Id. at 1546. 
 38.  Id.
 39.  See id.
 40.  Id. at 1550. 
 41.  Id. at 1547-48. 
 42.  Id. at 1548. 
 43.  Id.
 44.  Id.
 45.  See id. at 1549. 
 46.  Id.
 47.  See id. at 1550. 
 48.  Id.
 49.  Id.
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Despite the fact that Spokeo pertains to a statutory violation of the 
FCRA, its standing analysis is still applicable to BIPA. Its applicability is 
readily apparent from the analogies between statutes. The FCRA also con-
tains a provision that allows for civil liability brought by individual private 
actions requesting statutory damages in cases of noncompliance.50 That 
similarity has implications for how BIPA’s provision is interpreted. 
Spokeo’s reasoning has clearly influenced other federal courts in dismissing 
BIPA cases based on lack of Article III standing. 
For example, in McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., the plaintiff, 
McCollough, brought a class action lawsuit against the defendant, Smarte 
Carte, a company that owns and operates electronic lockers and other ser-
vices for use in public places for a fee.51 In order to operate the lockers, the 
renter’s fingerprint is used as a key.52 McCollough alleged that she used 
Smarte Carte’s lockers five times in 2015, using her fingerprint each 
time.53 McCollough alleged that Smarte Carte violated BIPA by retaining 
her fingerprint data without McCollough’s written consent.54 McCollough 
further alleged that Smarte Carte did not publicly disclose its retention 
schedule nor did it disclose the purpose and length of time for which the 
fingerprint data would be collected, stored, and used, also in violation of 
BIPA.55 Smarte Carte brought a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, arguing that McCollough did not allege an injury to 
satisfy Article III standing.56
The court in McCollough, following the reasoning of the Court in 
Spokeo, found for Smarte Carte.57 The court reasoned that, to satisfy the 
injury-in-fact requirement, McCollough must allege an injury that is con-
crete and particularized. The court relied on previous Supreme Court prec-
edent to stating that “deprivation of a procedural right without some 
concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation . . . is insufficient to 
create Article III standing.”58 The court found that McCollough had not 
alleged that harm resulted from Smarte Carte’s alleged BIPA violation.59
The court held that McCollough did not have standing under Article III, as 
 50.  15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1970). 
 51.  McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108 at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2016). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id.
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at *2. 
 56.  Id. at *3-4 
 57.  See id. at *5-6. 
 58.  Id. at *3 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009)). 
 59.  Id. at *3. 
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her allegation of a violation of BIPA did not satisfy the concrete injury 
requirement under Article III.60
McCollough, and other federal cases with similar findings, do not 
properly interpret the holding of Spokeo. The McCollough court cites to 
Supreme Court authority to support their holding that a bare violation of 
the statute is insufficient to create Article III standing. Spokeo, however, 
does not contain such a narrow holding. Rather, Spokeo leaves open the 
possibility of a violation of a statutory right to satisfy concreteness, and, 
thus, the requirement of standing, should the risk of real harm exist.61
Spokeo’s specific holding instead prohibits a de facto injury flowing from a 
bare procedural violation of a statute. This holding begs the question—of 
what does a procedural violation consist? 
Subsequent post-Spokeo caselaw has begun interpreting the distinction 
between procedural and substantive violations, including in the BIPA con-
text. In Bautz v. ARS Nat’l Servs., the trial court found standing in an action 
alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) 
and requesting relief in the form of statutory damages. In finding that 
Bautz’s allegation of a violation of the FDCPA was sufficient to satisfy 
concreteness, the court noted that “[c]ongress has the authority to create 
new legal interests by statute, the invasion of which can support stand-
ing.”62 As such, the court, citing Supreme Court precedent, held that a vio-
lation can rise to the level of a substantive violation where historical 
practice and congressional judgment support finding a substantive right.63
In Bautz, the court found that, as Congress enacted the FDCPA to remedy 
the precise conduct alleged in the action, the violation should be considered 
a substantive violation and is a de facto injury, satisfying the concreteness 
requirement.64 As the FDCPA provides for a private right of action and 
relief in the form of statutory damages upon violation, it is analogous to 
BIPA and relevant in guiding courts’ interpretation of injury-in-fact for 
BIPA cases.65
Other caselaw has supported this view and provided additional guid-
ance in distinguishing between the violation types. In Aranda v. Caribbean 
Cruise Lines, a case finding standing for an action alleging a violation of 
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) and requesting statutory 
 60.  Id. at *4. 
 61.  Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).  
 62.  Bautz v. ARS Nat’l Servs., 226 F. Supp. 3d 131, 138 (E.D. N.Y. 2016) (citing Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)). 
 63.  Id. at 141 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992)).
 64.  Id. at 147. 
 65.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k (1977). 
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damages, the court made a differentiation between substantive and proce-
dural violations.66 The court compared the two types of violations, explain-
ing: “[i]n contrast to statutes that impose obligations regarding how one 
manages data, keeps records, or verifies information, . . . the TCPA directly 
prohibits a person from taking actions directed at consumers, who will be 
actively touched by that person’s conduct.”67 The Aranda court ultimately 
held that the TCPA violation was a substantive violation.68 As such, the 
statutory violation was sufficient to warrant a concrete injury, which was 
ultimately essential in the court’s finding that the plaintiff satisfied the 
injury-in-fact requirement without an allegation of any greater harm be-
yond statutory noncompliance.69
Aranda’s substantive violation framework is similarly applicable to 
BIPA. To begin, both BIPA and the TCPA are statutorily analogous, in that 
they both allow for a private right of action requesting statutory damages in 
the event of statutory noncompliance.70 In Aranda, the court differentiates 
substantive violations from procedural violations based on whether the 
statute dictates the direct action defendants must take beyond simple record 
keeping.71 Under Aranda, it could be easily argued that BIPA is merely 
procedural because of the fact that it deals solely with data and could be 
characterized as a statute that seemingly only regulates how private entities 
should handle biometric data.72 However, BIPA goes beyond regulating 
how companies manage biometric data: it requires private entities to take 
affirmative steps to provide notice and collect consent prior to the collec-
tion, use, storage, or dissemination of someone’s biometric data.73 Just like 
TCPA “prohibits certain kind of telephonic contact with consumers without 
first obtaining their consent,”74 BIPA requires private entities to take direct 
action in the form of notion and collection of consent prior to collecting, 
using, storing, or disseminating biometric data.75 As such, a BIPA violation 
should be considered to affect a plaintiff’s substantive rights, such that a 
plaintiff should be able to establish concreteness. 
 66.  202 F. Supp. 3d 850, 857 (N.D. Ill. 2016). 
 67.  Id. at 858. 
 68.  Id. at 858. 
 69.  Id.
 70.  47 U.S.C § 227(b)(3) (1991). 
 71.  202 F. Supp. 3d at 858. 
 72.  See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§14/1–14/99 (2019). 
 73.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 14/15(b)–(d) (2019). 
 74.  Aranda, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 857. 
 75.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 14/15(b)–(d) (2019). 
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Were the Aranda court to find that a violation of the TCPA should in-
stead be categorized as a procedural violation, however, it would not auto-
matically be the case that the allegation of a statutory violation without 
further harm is insufficient to satisfy the concrete requirement and, ulti-
mately, the injury-in-fact requirement. Instead, it must undergo a unique 
analysis separate from violations deemed substantive.76 In Strubel v. 
Comenity Bank, a case finding standing in an action alleging violations of 
the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), the court held that Spokeo should not 
be considered to bar all violations of statutorily mandated procedures from 
satisfying injury-in-fact.77 In analyzing whether the violation was sufficient 
to satisfy concreteness, the court formulated a test for analyzing procedural 
violations.78 The court held that the critical inquiry was whether the proce-
dural violation presented a “risk of real harm” to a concrete interest.79 De-
termining that Comenity Bank’s actions gave rise to a risk of real harm to 
the consumer’s concrete interest in the informed use of credit, the court 
held that Strubel did not have to allege additional harm to satisfy concrete 
injury requirement.80 This case is again instructive in BIPA inquiries be-
cause TILA is an analogous statute in that it also provides for a private 
right of action with relief in the form of statutory damages upon noncom-
pliance with the statutory provisions.81
Thus, the McCollough court was incorrect in its interpretation of 
Spokeo. Again, its interpreted holding of Spokeo was far too broad. While 
the above cases are persuasive authority to the McCollough court, they 
illustrate that the language of Spokeo very clearly states that only bare pro-
cedural violations are insufficient without a risk of real harm. Thus, given 
the guidance from the above caselaw, the McCollough court’s analysis of 
Smarte Carte’s conduct was insufficient. 
The McCollough court, and all subsequent courts analyzing motions to 
dismiss BIPA complaints based on a lack of Article III standing, should 
analyze through the above framework. Based on the above caselaw, 
McCollough’s BIPA allegations should be considered a substantive viola-
tion. The structure of the government and principles of federalism give 
states the power to legislate where unrestricted by federal legislation.82 The 
Illinois legislature has the ability to create new legal interests for Illinois, 
 76.  Bautz v. ARS Nat’l Servs., 226 F. Supp. 3d 131, 148 (E.D. N.Y. 2016). 
 77.  842 F.3d 181, 189 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 78.  Id. at 190. 
 79.  Id.
 80.  Id.
 81.  15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1968).  
 82.  See New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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just as Congress has the ability to do for the country.83 As such, consider-
ing the Illinois legislature validly enacted BIPA, their judgment should be 
deferred to just as one defers to Congress’s judgment in the passage of 
federal legislation. 
In enacting BIPA, the Illinois legislature sought to protect its resi-
dents’ biometric data from abuse.84 While, theoretically, this statute could 
be characterized as accomplishing this goal by proscribing how companies 
manage data and keep their records, it goes beyond a typical recordkeeping 
statute because it also contains provisions that directly affect consumers. In 
including provisions that require companies to create a written notice and 
gather written consent to collect a consumer’s biometric data, the Illinois 
legislature has essentially included what amounts to an informed consent 
provision. Informed consent requirements in the medical malpractice con-
text differ from state to state, but certain aspects are analogous to this con-
text. For example, in Delaware, to recover, a plaintiff is required to plead 
and prove via preponderance of the evidence that the patient didn’t receive 
the customary amount of informed consent.85 In Pennsylvania, a plaintiff is 
required to plead and prove that receiving the lacking information would 
have been a factor in the decision to undergo surgery.86
While perhaps not directly analogous, these statutes illustrate that fail-
ing to provide information prior to consent can result in civil liability. They 
also show that violations of informed consent provisions have a direct ef-
fect on the uninformed. While the effect in the medical context may be 
more extreme, the effect in this context is nonetheless important. Biometric 
data, just like a social security number, runs the risk of identity theft. How-
ever, unlike a social security number, it is unable to be changed. For this 
reason, knowledge of who has your biometric information, what they are 
doing with it, and with whom they are sharing it is essential. Without this 
information, consumers expose themselves broadly to irremediable identity 
theft. As such, consumers are directly affected by a breach of this nature, 
and it is a breach the legislature created the statute to prevent against. As 
such, Smarte Carte’s alleged BIPA violations should be deemed substan-
tive violations sufficient to satisfy concreteness. 
In the alternative, if a court were to find that McCollough’s BIPA al-
legations should be classified as a procedural violation, the action should 
 83.  Morgan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940). 
 84.  See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/5 (2019). 
 85.  18 DEL. CODE § 6852 (1995).  
 86.  40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.504 (2002).  
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nonetheless satisfy standing because BIPA allegations clearly carry a real 
risk of harm. 
Though McCollough does not allege that further harm resulted from 
Smarte Carte’s alleged BIPA violations, it is logical to infer a real risk of 
harm from the plaintiff’s allegations. Justice Alito, in Spokeo, states that 
“Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a bare proce-
dural violation.”87 McCollough’s allegations amount to more than a bare 
procedural violation because the risk of a violation of BIPA is distinguish-
able from the risks stemming from a violation of the FCRA and are more 
analogous to the risks stemming from a violation of the TILA, FDCPA, or 
the TCPA. In Spokeo, risks resulting from the alleged violation could be 
summed up by dissemination of incorrect identifying information. The 
greatest material risk in Spokeo is that a prospective employer believes that 
Robins lives in Vernon Hills, Illinois (60061) instead of Chicago, Illinois 
(60661). On the other hand, the risks inherent in the statutory violations 
alleged in McCollough are far greater. McCollough risks that her biometric 
information is disclosed without her consent, permission, or notice. As 
stated above, without knowledge of into which hands her biometric infor-
mation has fallen, McCollough would be unable to protect her information 
against identity theft. As a violation of BIPA naturally carries a material 
risk of harm, were a violation of BIPA to be considered procedural, it 
should still satisfy the concreteness requirement. 
That natural difference between BIPA and other statutes is seen in the 
type of information protected under BIPA as compared to the FCRA, 
which should also be significant for the court to consider in evaluating 
concreteness of a violation of BIPA. Under the FCRA, the nature of the 
information to be protected is dynamic, meaning it is ever-changing and 
evolving as a person moves through her life, and, while collectively, it can 
serve in a personally-identifying role, independently, the information is not 
personally-identifying. In Spokeo, for example, the information presented 
in Robins’s profile included his marital status, his age, his occupation, his 
financial status, and his education level.88 However, the nature of the in-
formation BIPA protects is far more private. BIPA protects biometric iden-
tifiers and information, which, again, are impossible to change. Once 
biometric identifiers or information are compromised, it is entirely impos-
sible to replace. As the nature of the information BIPA seeks to protect is 
much more private than that of the FCRA, Spokeo should be considered 
 87.  Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (emphasis added).  
 88.  Id. at 1546. 
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instructive only in creation of an analytical framework for determining 
which statutory violations satisfy concreteness and not as a directly analo-
gous statutory example. 
This result is supported by the court’s holding in Patel v. Facebook,
Inc.89 In Patel, the court utilizes its own framework to analyze the plain-
tiffs’ Article III standing for their BIPA claims.90 The Facebook court was 
faced with analyzing whether Facebook users had Article III standing to 
bring a claim under BIPA.91 Facebook plaintiffs brought their BIPA claims 
as a result of Facebook’s “tag suggestion” software, which utilizes bio-
metric technology to create a facial scan of any faces in an any photograph 
uploaded to the website when the uploading user has tag suggestions ena-
bled.92 Facebook then uses the facial recognition software to identify 
whether the user’s friends appear in the photograph and offer a proposed 
Facebook user to tag in said photograph.93 Facebook plaintiffs claim that 
Facebook violated BIPA by failing to issue a public retention and destruc-
tion policy and similarly failing to notify them and obtain their consent 
before collection, usage, and storage of their biometric information.94
The Facebook court conflates the substantive and procedural violation 
analysis into its own two-step approach, which asks “(1) whether the statu-
tory provisions at issue were established to protect [the plaintiff’s] concrete 
interests . . . and if so, (2) whether the specific procedural violations al-
leged . . . present a material risk of harm to, such interests.”95 The court 
finds that, not only does the common law support recognizing interests that 
protect personal privacy rights, which are intertwined with constitutional 
zones of personal privacy protections, but the Illinois legislature was clear 
as well in its intent to do the same.96 Further, the defendant’s behavior was 
of the exact nature the statute sought to prevent, which the plaintiff explic-
itly alleges the defendant violated, indeed creating a risk of material harm 
to the very interest the Illinois legislature intended to protect.97
While the Facebook court’s Article III standing analysis covers both 
aspects of substantive and procedural statutory analysis, the distinction 
between procedural and substantive categories remains important, mainly 
 89.  932 F.3d 1264, 1275 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 90.  Id. at 1270-71. 
 91.  Id. at 1267. 
 92.  Id. at 1268. 
 93.  Id.
 94.  Id.
 95.  Id. at 1270-71.  
 96.  Id. at 1271-74. 
 97.  Id. at 1274-75. 
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due to the language in Spokeo, which specifically refers to procedural vio-
lations.98 As such, should a plaintiff be able to avoid categorization as a 
procedural statutory violation, which as explained supra, a BIPA violation 
should, it is theoretically easier for her to establish concreteness and, in 
turn, survive a motion to dismiss arguing a lack of Article III standing. 
B. BIPA Plaintiffs Likewise Satisfy State Procedural Standing 
State courts have seen similar standing arguments made in motions to 
dismiss complaints brought alleging BIPA violations. Illinois state courts, 
however, have a different standard for standing than Article III standing in 
federal courts.99 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and Arti-
cle III of the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction by requiring an actual 
case or controversy.100 State courts, however, are courts of original jurisdic-
tion, intended to be open to all justiciable issues.101 In Illinois, “[t]he pur-
pose of the standing doctrine is to ensure that courts are deciding actual, 
specific controversies and not abstract ones.”102 As a result, standing doc-
trine in Illinois differs significantly from Article III standing.103 A notable 
difference between the two is that standing in Illinois tends to give greater 
liberality to plaintiffs.104 Illinois courts have described standing to require 
“only some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest.”105
Further, while federal courts require the plaintiff to plead standing, Il-
linois state courts do not place a burden on the plaintiff to plead and prove 
the same.106 Instead, standing in Illinois is an affirmative defense asserted 
by the defendant, who is required to plead and prove a lack of standing, 
rather than by the plaintiff as a threshold bar to subject-matter jurisdic-
tion.107
Considering Illinois’s state courts have a more liberal application of 
the standing doctrine, it is far more likely that an Illinois court would find 
for procedural standing in a BIPA case. Even a “technical violation” of the 
 98.  Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
 99.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60; Greer v. Illinois Housing Dev. 
Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 491, 524 N.E.2d 561, 574 (1988); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
 100.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 101.  Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 491. 
 102.  Maschek v. City of Chicago, 2015 IL App (1st) 150520, ¶ 84, 46 N.E.3d 843, 858 (citing In
re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 32, 989 N.E.2d 173). 
 103.  See In re Estate of Burgeson, 125 Ill. 2d 477, 484-85, 532 N.E.2d 825, 828 (1988). 
 104.  See Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 491. 
 105.  Id. at 492. 
 106.  Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206, 724 
N.E.2d 914, 918 (2000). 
 107.  Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 494. 
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statute, one in which the allegation of injury is derived from defendant’s 
breach of the statutory language without further facts alleging resulting 
harm, could be fairly classified as an injury in fact to a legally cognizable 
interest. 
A technical violation would satisfy Illinois standing because it is dis-
tinct and palpable, fairly traceable to defendant’s actions, and redressable. 
Illinois standing does not contain the same rigor of concreteness and par-
ticularity requirements within injury-in-fact, which are the source of much 
of Article III standing jurisprudence.108 As such, BIPA plaintiffs should be 
able to easily satisfy Illinois’s injury-in-fact requirement, and, in turn, Illi-
nois standing. 
C. Resolving Statutory Standing (“Person Aggrieved”) in Favor of 
Plaintiffs 
In order to maintain an action under BIPA, a plaintiff must satisfy not 
only procedural standing in the form of either Article III standing or Illi-
nois’s standing doctrine, but a plaintiff must also satisfy “statutory stand-
ing,” which is an inquiry separate and distinct from procedural standing. 
That is, the plaintiff must fall within the category of individuals given a 
private right of action by the statute. Under BIPA, this group of individuals 
consists of “[a]ny person[s] aggrieved by a violation of this Act.”109 Inter-
pretation of this language was overwhelmingly litigated in past years, 
though recently resolved by the Illinois Supreme Court in Rosenbach v. Six 
Flags Entertainment Corporation.110
Beginning in 2015 and the years following, multiple class action law-
suits were brought based on violations of BIPA, requesting relief in the 
form of statutory damages.111 In January 2016, one such class action law-
suit was brought by Stacy Rosenbach, alleging a violation of her son’s 
rights under BIPA when an amusement park, Six Flags Great America 
(“Six Flags”), collected her son’s fingerprint while registering him for a 
season pass to the park.112 Rosenbach alleged that Six Flags did not give 
her son any literature that specified the purpose, length of term for which 
her son’s fingerprint would be collected, stored, and used, nor did Rosen-
 108.  Id. at 492-93. 
 109.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008).  
 110.  Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 40, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1207.
 111.  Rottner v. Palm Beach Tan, No. 15-CH-16695, 2016 WL 11397938, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2016); 
see Grabowska v. Millard Maintenance Co., No. 17-CH-13730, 2017 WL 4767159 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017); 
Rapai v. Hyatt Corp., No. 17-CH-14483, 2017 WL 5015841 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017); Howe v. Speedway, 
LLC, No. 17-CH-11992, 2017 WL 4019942 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017). 
 112.  Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 7. 
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bach or her son sign a written release.113 Rosenbach requested relief in the 
form of statutory damages, alleging that, while she and her son did not 
suffer additional harm, she would not have purchased a season pass for her 
son had she known of Six Flags’ conduct.114
Six Flags brought a motion to dismiss Rosenbach’s complaint, arguing 
that a person who suffers no additional harm is not “aggrieved” under 
BIPA and thus cannot sustain an action under the statute.115 The trial court 
denied Six Flags’ motion to dismiss, but certified two questions under Illi-
nois Supreme Court Rule 308 for appellate review.116 The two questions 
for review were: 
[W]hether an individual is an aggrieved person under section 20 of the 
Act and may seek statutory liquidated damages authorized under section 
20(1) of the Act . . . when the only injury he or she alleges is a violation of 
section 15(b) of the Act by a private entity that collected his or her bio-
metric identifiers and/or biometric information without providing him or 
her the disclosures and obtaining the written consent required by section 
15(b) or the Act and 
[W]hether an individual is an aggrieved person under section 20 of the 
Act and may seek injunctive relief authorized under section 20(4) of the 
Act . . . when the only injury he or she alleges is a violation of section 
15(b) of the act by a private entity that collected his or her biometric 
identifiers and/or biometric information without providing him or her the 
disclosures and obtaining the written consent required by section 15(b) 
of the Act.117
On appellate review, Six Flags again argued that the interpretation of 
person “aggrieved” under the statute that is most consistent with BIPA’s 
language and purpose and with other interpretations of the term in other 
statutes and in other jurisdictions requires actual harm or adverse conse-
quences to fall within the intended coverage of the statute.118 Rosenbach 
argued that a technical violation of BIPA was sufficient to render a party 
“aggrieved.”119
The appellate court agreed with Six Flags, relying on a legal diction-
ary definition of “aggrieved,” authority from lower courts, and general 
rules of statutory construction in holding that “a plaintiff who alleges only 
 113.  Id. at ¶ 8. 
 114.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
 115.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at ¶ 15 (internal citations omitted). 
 118.  Id. at ¶ 18. 
 119.  Id. 
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a technical violation of the statute without alleging some injury or adverse 
effect is not an aggrieved person under section 20 of the Act.”120 The court 
concludes that Rosenbach’s allegations of violations of the notice and con-
sent provisions of BIPA are technical violations and, thus, they do not 
equate to alleging an adverse effect or harm.121 As such, the court con-
cludes that, to maintain a cause of action under BIPA, Rosenbach would 
need to allege an “actual injury, adverse effect, or harm in order for the 
person to be ‘aggrieved.’”122
The Illinois Supreme Court, reviewing the issue de novo,123 reversed 
the appellate court ruling and found that “an individual need not allege 
some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond violation of his or her rights 
under the Act, in order to qualify as an ‘aggrieved’ person” and maintain 
statutory standing under BIPA.124 The court relies heavily on tools of gen-
eral statutory construction in its analysis, comparing section 14/20 to vari-
ous other Illinois statutes that provide aggrieved individuals a private right 
of action, historical case law definitions of the term “aggrieved,” and 
standard dictionary definitions of the term “aggrieved.”125 The court further 
justifies its analysis by citing to the legislature’s intent, characterizing the 
express language of the legislature in granting a private right of action to 
any individual who suffers a violation of the statute as “unambiguous.”126
The Illinois Supreme Court additionally addresses one aspect of the 
appellate court opinion it found to be particularly egregious—the Appellate 
Court’s de facto categorization of Rosenbach’s allegation as a mere “tech-
nical violation.”127 While the Illinois Supreme Court agrees this is an im-
proper categorization, the Court continues on to discuss the benefits of the 
so-called “procedural protections” afforded by the statute.128 By classifying 
BIPA plainly as a procedural statute, the Court misses an opportunity to 
analyze the statute differently and, in a way, does harm to the strength of 
the statute. 
While statutory standing is a distinct inquiry from Article III standing, 
the categorization of substantive and procedural violations can be instruc-
tive in analyzing statutory standing as well. Where the appellate court relies 
 120.  Id. at ¶¶ 20-23. 
 121.  Id. at ¶ 21. 
 122.  Id. at ¶ 20. 
 123.  Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 18, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1202. 
 124.  Id. at ¶ 40. 
 125.  Id. at ¶¶ 27, 30-32.  
 126.  Id. at ¶¶ 35-38.  
 127.  Id. at ¶ 34. 
 128.  Id.
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so heavily on the language “mere technical violation,” the type of statute 
should be considered. It is feasible to liken the term “technical violation” to 
the procedural violation analysis of Article III. The use of the term “mere 
technical violation” leads to an appropriate inference that the appellate 
court considered a violation of BIPA’s notice and consent provision to be a 
breach in statutorily-mandated procedure, rather than as a breach of a sub-
stantive right conferred by the statute.129 By continuing the rhetoric that 
BIPA is procedural, the Illinois Supreme Court misses an opportunity for 
stronger analysis. 
As discussed in section 1A, supra, a violation of the notice and con-
sent provision in BIPA should be classified as a substantive violation, as it 
is a violation of conduct that the legislature specifically intended to remedy 
by creation of this statute and has a direct effect on consumers. Six Flags’ 
conduct in neglecting to circulate information regarding the collection, 
storage, use, or retention of a child’s biometric data and in neglecting to 
obtain written consent prior to that collection, storage, use, and retention of 
a child’s biometric data violates what the legislature intended to protect 
against in enacting BIPA, which is an idea expressed by the Illinois Su-
preme Court.130
Again, while the term “substantive violation” is a part of Article III 
standing jurisprudence, it is instructive here. The appellate court held that a 
plaintiff need only “allege some injury” in order to maintain statutory 
standing.131 If a substantive statutory violation is enough to be regarded as 
de facto concrete injury for Article III standing purposes, it is logical that a 
substantive violation for Article III purposes inherently alleges some injury. 
This substantive violation analysis would take the Court’s holding one step 
further, and the Court may have benefitted from grounding its opinion out-
side of statutory construction. Analysis requiring classification of the stat-
utes as substantive or procedural in nature is a less malleable way to 
interpret that statute. The more malleable a holding, the more room it 
leaves parties to interpret and litigate an issue already decided. 
D. Current Issues in BIPA Litigation 
While Rosenbach may have answered one question plaguing BIPA lit-
igation, dozens remain unanswered.132 Pre-Rosenbach litigation mainly 
 129.  See Rosenbach v. Six Flag Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶¶ 21-23. 
 130.  See Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 34, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1206. 
 131.  Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 23. 
 132.  See Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Rogers v. CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc., No. 
1:19-cv-2937, 2019 WL 4254057 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2019); Def. Kronos, Inc. Mem. in Support of Mot. 
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concerned the “aggrieved” question, but rulings from the pre-Rosenbach
era may be instructive in evaluating questions raised post-Rosenbach. One 
such issue raised by many defendants is the question of voluntariness and 
its effect on BIPA’s consent requirements.133 Some defendants argue in 
motions to dismiss and assert as an affirmative defense that plaintiffs vol-
untarily provided their fingerprints and other biometric data to defend-
ants.134 By voluntarily providing their biometric data to defendants, 
defendants contend that plaintiffs consented to the collection of their da-
ta.135
Pre-Rosenbach injury analysis may prove instructive in evaluating 
current BIPA disputes. For example, Rottner v. Palm Beach Tan, brought 
in 2015 in front of the Cook County Chancery Division, saw the plaintiff, 
Rottner, allege a violation of BIPA when the defendant, a tanning salon 
chain, Palm Beach Tan, enrolled Rottner in its national membership data-
base using her fingerprint.136 Rottner alleged that Palm Beach Tan did not 
provide its customers with information about collection of their biometric 
data, obtain a written release prior to collection of fingerprints, nor provide 
publicly available policy identifying its retention schedule and guidelines 
for destruction of data.137
Palm Beach Tan subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint with 
prejudice.138 Initially, the court denied Palm Beach Tan’s motion on the 
grounds that Rottner’s allegation of a violation of BIPA’s notice and con-
sent provision made her a “person aggrieved” under the statute, and, thus, 
she could sustain a cause of action.139 However, following the appellate-
level Rosenbach decision, the court granted Palm Beach Tan’s motion to 
reconsider.140 Dismissing the complaint, the court held that Rosenbach was 
to Dismiss, Crooms v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. 1:19-cv-02149, 2019 WL 3369501 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 
2019); Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Lydon v. Fillmore Hospitality, No. 1:19-cv-03989 
(N.D. Ill. July 19, 2019).  
 133.  See Def.’s First Am. Answer, Howe v. Speedway, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-01374 (N.D. Ill. May 
29, 2019); Def. NFI’s Answer, Defendant NFI Indus. Inc.’s Answer and Defenses to Plaintiff’s Pro-
posed Amended Class Action Complaint at 37, Stidwell v. Kronos, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-00770 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb 13, 2019); Def.’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses at 42-43, Young v. Worldwide Technology, 
LLC, 3:19-cv-00496-SMY-GCS (S.D. Ill. June 29, 2019). 
 134.  See Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Morris v. Wow Bao, No. 2017-CH-12029 (Ill. 
Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. June 7, 2019). 
 135.  See id.
 136.  Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, 2, 26-29, Rottner v. Palm Beach Tan, 
Inc., No. 15-CH-16695 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Nov. 13, 2015). 
 137.  Id. at 21-22. 
 138.  Order Granting Motion to Reconsider and Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice, Rottner v. 
Palm Beach Tan, No. 15-CH-16695, 2016 WL 11397938, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Mar. 2, 2016). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
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binding upon the court and required that the court dismiss Rottner’s com-
plaint based on an allegation of a technical violation of the statute.141
Rottner asserted that her complaint alleges more than a statutory viola-
tion, going as far as arguing that she suffered pecuniary damages and an 
injury to a privacy right.142 The court disagreed with Rottner’s conten-
tion.143 It found that, because Rottner voluntarily submitted to the finger-
print scan, and there was no publication of Rottner’s fingerprint 
information, she did not suffer an injury to a privacy right.144
While Rottner’s explicit holding—that the plaintiff did not suffer an 
injury sufficient to confer statutory standing—is no longer good law, the 
reasoning could have implications for arguments concerning voluntari-
ness.145 A defendant could conceivably use the language of Rottner to ar-
gue that, while a plaintiff may have suffered an injury sufficient to confer 
statutory standing, she should not ultimately prevail on her claim because 
she submitted her fingerprint voluntarily and should not recover under the 
statute. The persuasiveness of this argument, however, is doubtful. 
BIPA requires written consent for the collection of biometric data.146
An employee who places her finger on a scanner to clock in or a customer 
who chooses to use facial recognition technology while she places her or-
der does not give written consent by these actions alone. Accordingly, an 
employer or company who relies on her selection of biometric technology 
as her only consent does not satisfy the requirement of written consent. 
Even where BIPA does not require written consent, the argument is unper-
suasive. BIPA can be likened to an informed consent statute. Violation of a 
privacy right, even where voluntarily submitted, is actionable in other con-
texts. For example, in the context of surgery, a patient has the right to in-
formed consent.147 Even though the patient voluntarily submits herself to 
surgery, she has the right to sue for lack of informed consent should the 
doctor have not told the patient a critical piece of information in advance of 
the surgery, even without additional negligence on the behalf of the doc-
tor.148 Thus, while that employee or customer may have chosen to utilize 
 141.  Id. at *2. 
 142.  See id.
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(3) (2008). 
 147.  See Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990). 
 148.  See Hannemann v. Boyson, 282 Wis. 2d 664, 703 (2005) (finding a chiropractor’s duty to 
obtain informed consent is equal to that of a medical doctor and does not require resulting negligent 
treatment for a finding of liability); Andersen v. Khanna, 913 N.W.2d 526, 546 (2018) (finding “the 
plaintiff’s ‘injury’ from the physician’s failure to obtain informed consent does not have to be physical 
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biometric technology, she does not know by mere virtue of this choice that 
her biometric data is being collected and stored. She should have access to 
that information prior to submitting her biometric data, and, under BIPA, it 
is the collecting entity’s responsibility to provide it.149
Dixon v. Washington & Jane Smith Community—Beverly, another pre-
Rosenbach decision, supports this analysis. In Dixon, the plaintiff, Cynthia 
Dixon, brought a class action suit against her former employer, Smith Sen-
ior Living (“Smith”) and its timekeeping vendor, Kronos, Inc. (“Kronos”), 
alleging violations of BIPA.150 The court, denying a 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, found that BIPA establishes Dixon’s right to privacy in her bio-
metric information.151 The court held that “obtaining or disclosing a per-
son’s biometric data without her consent or knowledge necessarily 
infringes on the right to privacy in that data.”152 The court ultimately found 
that, though this harm is not tangible or pecuniary, it is an actual and con-
crete harm that stems from the defendants’ alleged BIPA violations.153 As 
such, the harm, dissemination of Dixon’s information to a third-party ven-
dor and the consequential privacy right violation, is sufficient to support 
Dixon’s claim under BIPA.154
Following Dixon, in Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., the 
First District of the Illinois Appellate Court found that Sekura, where she 
freely gave her fingerprint to enroll in an L.A. Tan database, had a privacy 
right in her fingerprint data.155 Dissemination of that data to a third-party 
without her knowledge or consent would amount to a violation of that pri-
vacy right, regardless of whether or not she freely gave her fingerprint.156
Again, while Dixon and Sekura do not explicitly evaluate the consent 
and voluntariness argument, they may prove persuasive to future courts 
evaluating this issue, as their holdings have many legal implications. Both 
are notable in that the courts take an expansive view of BIPA. While the 
statute explicitly provides that consent must be in writing for collection and 
storage of data, it does not mandate the same written requirement for con-
sent for disclosure of biometric data.157 Thus, BIPA’s disclosure consent 
or a result of the materialization of the undisclosed risk” and that informed consent is a separate method 
of imposing liability from negligence and allows for recovery when treatment was not negligent). 
 149.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(1).  
 150.  No. 17 C 8033, 2018 WL 2445292, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018). 
 151.  Id. at *12. 
 152.  Id. at *11. 
 153.  Id.
 154.  Id.
 155.  2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 77, 115 N.E.3d 1080, 1096. 
 156.  Id. at ¶¶ 76-77. 
 157.  Compare 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b) (2008) with 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(d) (2008). 
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mandate is arguably more susceptible to the voluntariness argument, as it is 
more reasonable to contend that voluntary use is akin to acknowledgement 
of the risks inherent in using biometric technology and implicit consent to 
those risks. As the statute does not require explicit consent for disclosure, it 
is feasible that a court could find voluntary use of biometric technology 
equates to consent to disclosure of biometric data.158
However, the Dixon court treats collection and disclosure equally, 
finding that Dixon’s allegations that the defendant obtained or disclosed 
her biometric data without knowledge or consent was an injury sufficient to 
confer statutory standing.159 In Dixon, the plaintiff used her fingerprint to 
clock in and out of work.160 While clocking in and out of work was a re-
quirement of her job, she used her fingerprint freely.161 The same is true of 
the plaintiff in Sekura, where the court held the same.162 Despite this, the 
court still found that her allegation of dissemination without consent was 
adequate to maintain a cause of action.163 While Dixon and Sekura do not 
answer the voluntariness question outright, they certainly imply that volun-
tary use of biometric technology is not sufficient to procure consent for 
either collection and storage under Section 15(b) or dissemination under 
Section 15(d). Both courts find that, despite voluntarily offering their fin-
gerprint data, both are able to maintain a cause of action based on a viola-
tion of a privacy right. 
A variety of other interpretation issues are currently plaguing the 
court, largely involving interpretation of BIPA’s statutory language.164 As 
explained supra, BIPA applies to biometric identifiers or information. 
Some defendants argue that technology, like timeclocks, that utilize hand 
geometry or fingerprint scans as a method for authentication, do not actual-
ly fit under the definition of biometric data, as any scans are converted into 
 158.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(d). 
 159.  Dixon, No. 17 C 8033, 2018 WL 2445292, at *10. 
 160.  Id. at *1. 
 161.  Id. at *10. 
 162.  Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶¶ 8, 77, 115 N.E.3d 1080, 
1084, 1096. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  See Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Bruhn v. New Albertson’s, Inc., No. 2018-CH-
01737 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Aug. 20, 2019) (arguing against constitutionality of BIPA); Def.’s Mem. 
in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Mosby v. Ingalls Memorial Hosp., No. 2018-CH-05031 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
Cook Cty., June 5, 2019) (arguing for dismissal under a HIPAA exception under BIPA); Def.’s Mem. in 
Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Diaz v. Silver Cross Hosp., No. 2018-CH-001327 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Will Cty., 
June 3, 2019) (arguing for dismissal under a BIPA HIPAA exception); Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to 
Dismiss, Heard v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No. 1:19-cv-04158 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2019) (arguing for 
dismissal under a BIPA HIPAA exception); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2008). 
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and stored as data points.165 Section 10 also provides for exceptions to 
compliance with the statute.166 Certain exceptions include “information 
captured from a patient in a health care setting or information collected, 
used, or stored for health care treatment, payment, or operations under the 
federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.”167
Government actors are similarly dispensed of complying with BIPA’s re-
quirements.168 These exceptions have created their own disputes within 
BIPA litigation—from assertions that BIPA excepts any entity in the medi-
cal field from complying with BIPA, called the “HIPAA-BIPA exception,” 
to contentions that BIPA’s exclusion of government actors renders the stat-
ute unconstitutional.169 Some of these arguments, like the “HIPAA-BIPA 
exception,” have been ruled on by several courts at the trial level, while 
others are still being briefed or are awaiting a ruling. However, with the 
high volume of BIPA cases pending in courts across Illinois, these argu-
ments will continue to be raised and briefed in subsequent Motions to Dis-
miss class action BIPA complaints. 
II. INTERPRETING BIPA GOING FORWARD
As technology advances and evolves, the possible uses for biometric 
data are increasing along with thieves’ savviness.170 As such, the need to 
safeguard biometric data will only increase as time goes on.171 In fact, giv-
en the reality that technology will advance, the need to protect biometric 
data is pressing, as it is essential to prevent that data from falling into the 
 165.  See Def.’s Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Heard v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No. 
1:19-cv-04158 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2019); Def.’s Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Fields v. Abra 
Auto Body & Glass, LP, No. 2017-CH-12271 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Feb. 22, 2019). 
 166.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10. 
 167.  Id.
 168.  Id.
 169.  See Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Bruhn v. New Albertson’s, Inc., No. 2018-CH-
01737 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Aug. 20, 2019) (arguing against constitutionality of BIPA); Def.’s Mem. 
in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Mosby v. Ingalls Memorial Hosp., No. 2018-CH-05031 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
Cook Cty., June 5, 2019) (arguing for dismissal under a HIPAA exception under BIPA); Def.’s Mem. in 
Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Diaz v. Silver Cross Hosp., No. 2018-CH-001327 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Will Cty., 
June 3, 2019) (arguing for dismissal under a BIPA HIPAA exception); Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to 
Dismiss, Heard v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No. 1:19-cv-04158 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2019) (arguing for 
dismissal under a BIPA HIPAA exception); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10. 
 170.  See Jon Porter, Huge Security Flaw Exposes Biometric Data of More than a Million Users,
THE VERGE (Aug. 14, 2019, 6:58 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/14/20805194/suprema-
biostar-2-security-system-hack-breach-biometric-info-personal-data [https://perma.cc/ULD4-DPTE]; 
Jayshree Pandya, Hacking Our Identity: The Emerging Threats from Biometric Technology, FORBES
(Mar. 9, 2019, 12:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/03/09/hacking-our-
identity-the-emerging-threats-from-biometric-technology/#4eeee7b65682 [https://perma.cc/77S6-
W2TA]. 
 171.  Pandya, supra note 170. 
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wrong hands now. The importance of protecting that information immedi-
ately is discussed within the text of BIPA itself.172 Biometric data is seem-
ingly the future of transaction.173 The legislature recognizes that it has an 
interest in promoting uses of information that will benefit society, but it 
also recognizes the fact that, given that each identifier is unique, theft 
leaves an individual without recourse.174 Thus, the legislature enacted 
BIPA to quell any public fears about biometric data theft and promote par-
ticipation in biometric technology that makes Illinois more efficient.175
Recognition of the desire to protect biometric data is reflected in broad 
interpretation of BIPA’s statutory provisions in judicial opinions, such as 
Dixon and Sekura. These opinions allow for broad application of the pri-
vate right of action to individuals affected by violations of BIPA and leave 
room for broad ultimate findings of liability resulting from BIPA viola-
tions. Expansive application of this section gives effect to the legislature’s 
intent to incentivize and require companies to safeguard consumers’ bio-
metric data. In these recent opinions, judges interpret BIPA broadly as 
compared to the damaging, narrow construction used in cases like Rosen-
bach, Rottner, and McCollough.176 These interpretations, on the other hand, 
are damaging to the purpose of the statute, as they allow for companies to 
escape liability for failing to safeguard biometric data. While recent inter-
pretations lean towards a broad application, likely in recognition of the 
importance of protecting biometric information, in order to properly safe-
guard biometric information from future identity theft, courts should con-
tinue to evaluate legislative intent carefully within the context of statutory 
interpretation. 
As Rosenbach, Rottner, and McCollough clearly illustrate, there are 
opposing judicial interpretations of the statute. Even though Rosenbach
ultimately resolved the issue of statutory standing, many disputes surround-
ing this statute remain unresolved, and Rosenbach may leave room for 
alternative interpretation by district courts.177 With portions left open to 
judicial interpretation, the possibility for inconsistent and incorrect applica-
 172.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (a)-(g). 
 173.  Id. at (a)-(b). 
 174.  Id. at (c). 
 175.  Id. at (d)-(g). 
176.  See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, at ¶ 28; Order Granting 
Mot. to Reconsider and Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice, Rottner v. Palm Beach Tan, No. 15-CH-
16695, 2016 WL 11397938, at *2 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Mar. 2, 2016); McCollough v. Smarte Carte, 
No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016). 
 177.  See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, at ¶¶ 12-13, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 
1201-02; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 671, 673 (1999).
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tion remains a realistic threat. Inconsistent and incorrect application is a 
problem for accomplishment of BIPA’s legislative purpose, as it hinders 
accomplishing the goal of safeguarding biometric data by disincentivizing 
companies from following BIPA’s statutory provisions and leaves bio-
metric data vulnerable. 
BIPA’s clear lesson is that courts must tread carefully when faced 
with the heavy task of interpreting a statute that has not been consistently 
drafted by the legislature. BIPA’s own language shows that the statute was 
not consistently drafted, but it does contain a straight-forward statement of 
legislative intent.178 While Illinois is currently the only state with biometric 
information privacy laws that grant a private right of action, other states, 
such as Texas and Washington, have enacted strict biometric data privacy 
laws that similarly restrict companies’ ability to collect and store biometric 
data without consent and notice.179 Texas’s and Washington’s statutes al-
low for enforcement of their biometric privacy statutes by their attorney 
generals only. The language in both statutes, however, is far clearer as to 
what constitutes a violation sufficient to maintain a cause of action. Wash-
ington’s statute provides, “a violation of this chapter is not reasonable in 
relation to the development and preservation of business and is an unfair or 
deceptive act in trade or commerce and an unfair of method of competition 
for the purpose of applying the consumer protection act.”180 Texas’s statute 
simply provides, “a person who violates this section is subject to a civil 
penalty of not more than $25,000 for each violation.”181 While, again, these 
statutes do not recognize a private right of action, they make clear what 
constitutes an actionable violation of the statute without qualification. Oth-
er states have proposed biometric privacy laws that not only include a pri-
vate right of action, but also omit the heavily litigated “persons aggrieved” 
language in BIPA. Alaska, for example, provides a private right of actions 
to “an individual . . . against a person who intentionally violates [the stat-
ute],” expressly defining “person” and “intentionally.”182
The current legislative formulation of Illinois’s BIPA leaves open 
much to interpretation by its statutory language, which will likely continue 
to lead to conflicting interpretation and inconsistent application. Careless 
judicial treatment of statutory interpretation will be detrimental to the legis-
 178.  See generally 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2008).  
 179.  TEX. BUS & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(b) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020(1) 
(2017). 
 180.  WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.030(1) (emphasis added). 
 181.  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(d). 
 182.  H.B. 72, 30th Leg., 1st Sess., (Alaska 2017). 
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lative purpose of the statute. Where the legislative purpose is explicit, like 
in section 5 of BIPA, the court should interpret the statute broadly in favor 
of that purpose going forward.183
CONCLUSION
In sum, BIPA’s current statutory formulation leaves much room for 
incorrect interpretation of a statute with clear intentions. Courts should 
continue the trend of broad interpretations of BIPA’s requirements, as that 
will lead to accomplishment of legislative intent. 
 183.  Wittman v. Koenig, 831 F.3d 416, 424 (7th Cir. 2016).  
